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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 1996, President Clinton signed The Economic Espionage Act of
1996 (“EEA”) into law. 1 The EEA made theft of trade secrets a federal criminal offense. 2
In 2008, this author recommended two critical amendments to the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996: (1) the addition of a private civil cause of action; (2) the addition of a civil
ex parte seizure provision. 3 Alarm bells were ringing loud and clear in 2008: trade
secret theft had become rampant, United States’ industry had become the equivalent
of a giant cookie jar permitting foreign agents and unscrupulous competitors to steal
American know-how with a low probability of detection or prosecution. 4 Consequently,
legislation was introduced in the 112th and 113th Congress to add a private civil cause
of action to the Economic Espionage Act and to add ex parte provisions to the EEA.5 In

© R. Mark Halligan 2015. Mr. Halligan is an accomplished trial lawyer who focuses his practice on
intellectual property litigation and complex commercial litigation, including antitrust and licensing
issues.Mr. Halligan has successfully represented both individuals and corporations as plaintiffs and
defendants in federal and state courts throughout the United States and Mr. Halligan is recognized
as a one of the leading lawyers in trade secrets litigation in the United States by Legal 500 and he is
recognized by Chambers USA: America’s Leading Lawyers for Business for his exceptional standing
in intellectual property law. In recent years, Mr. Halligan has been at the forefront of international
developments in intellectual property law and he is a recognized thought leader in the ever -growing
area of trade secrets law having spoken worldwide to numerous organizations and corporations on the
topic.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006)).
2 Id. at sec. 101, 110 Stat. 3489 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2006)).
3 R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. M ARSH. REV . I NTELL. P ROP. L. 656 (2008).
4 See Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriation, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 455, 463 (2006) (noting that there are over 3,000 Chinese
"front companies" that attempt to steal U.S. technologies); see also NAT'L INTELLECTUAL. PROP.
LAW. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND
PROTECTION
at
viii
(2008),
available
at
www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/TopNews/ssLINK/prod01_005189 [hereinafter NIPLECC Report]. In
the Letter of Transmittal, Chris Isreal, U.S. Coordinator for International Intellectual Property
Enforcement, states: "[r]ampant piracy remains all too common in major markets throughout the
world, and IP theft continues to be a serious problem here at home." Id.
5 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,207 (statement of Sen. Specter):
In an increasingly complex and competitive economic world, intellectual property
forms a critical component of our economy. As traditional industries shift to low wage producers in developing countries, our economic edge depends to an ever increasing degree on the ability of our businesses and inventors to stay one step
ahead of those in other countries. And American business and inventors have been
extremely successful and creative in developing intellectual property and trade
secrets. America leads the nation's [sic] of the world i n developing new products
and new technologies. Millions of jobs depend on the continuation of the productive
*
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the 113th Congress, Senators Chris Coons (D-DE) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) introduced
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S.2267, the first major bipartisan effort in this
regard. Subsequently, Representatives George Holding (R-NC) and Jerrold Nadler (DNY), along with over 20 bipartisan cosponsors, introduced a modified version of the
Coons-Hatch bill as The Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5233. In September
2014, the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported H.R. 5233 by voice vote. N o
further action occurred on the bill in the 113th Congress. 6 In the 114th Congress, on
July 30, 2015, the legislation was reintroduced in both chambers in identical and
concerted fashion. That legislation, named The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S.
1890 and H.R. 3326) was introduced in the Senate by Senators Hatch, Coons, Jeff
Flake (R-AZ), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI),
and in the House by Representatives Doug Collins (R-GA), Nadler, Holding, John
Conyers (D-MI), Steve Chabot (R-OH) and Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY). Committee action
is expected on the legislation in both chambers later this Congress. 7

II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EEA
The EEA legislative history illustrates that the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
was enacted to fill existing gaps in existing federal and state law and to create a
national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic information. 8 Congress
recognized that protecting U.S. trade secrets was necessary to "maintain our industrial
and economic edge and thus safeguard our national security." 9 According to Senator
Herbert H. Kohl, a company's proprietary information is incredibly important:
[B]usinesses spend huge amounts of money, time, and though developing
proprietary economic information -- their customer lists, pricing schedules,
business agreements, manufacturing processes. This information is literally
minds of Americans, both native born and immigrants who find the freedom here
to try new ideas and add to our economic strength.”
Id.; see also id. at H10,461 (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("In my opinion, our economic interests
should be seen as an integral part of [the country's] national security interests, because America's
standing in the world depends on its economic strength and productivity."); P ress Release, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Administration's Annual IP Report: IP Related Prosecutions Up, Focus on Health and
Safety
Redoubled
(Feb.
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_005190 [hereinafter Press
Release on IP Report] (quoting Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez as stating: "[c]reativity
and innovation are the lifeblood of the American economy, and i ntellectual property protection is vital
to ensure our economic health now and for the future").
6 Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014 [hereinafter TSPA], H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014), available
at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5233/cosponsors (last visited May 25,
2015).
7 See CONGRESS .G OV , https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5233 (last visited
May 28, 2015)(showing that the Trade Secret Protection Act, H.R. 5233, has been introduced, but not
passed during the 113th Congress).
8 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4022-23.
9 S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 11 (1996); see 142 CONG. REC. H10,461 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) ("In my opinion, our economic interests should be seen as an integral part of [the country's]
national security interests, because America's standing in the world depends on its economic strength
and productivity.").
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a business's lifeblood. And stealing it is the equivalent of shooting a company
in the head. . . . The economic strength, competitiveness, and security of our
country relies [sic] upon the ability of industry to compete without unfair
interference from foreign governments and from their own domestic
competitors. Without freedom from economic sabotage, our companies loose
[sic] their hard-earned advantages and their competitive edge. 10
These observations by Senator Kohl almost 20 years ago are manifested every day
in 2015. U.S. corporations are immersed in intense global competition and American
industry is being challenged both at home and abroad. 11 Today, it is estimated that
80% of the assets of new economy companies are intangible assets and the vast bulk of
intangible assets are trade secret assets. 12 Each year the protection of trade secret
assets is becoming more important to the competitiveness of U.S. industry and each
year the protection of trade secrets is becoming more important to the economic
strength and well-being of the nation. 13 These structural changes have been
accompanied by a computer revolution and transition to the Information Age. 14 The
power of computer technology has increased exponentially, resulting in more powerful
means for the theft and transfer of proprietary information. 15 The rapid growth of the
Internet is a reflection of this boom. 16 In fact, the corollary is also true: the Internet is
now a tool for the destruction of trade secret assets. 17

142 CONG. REC. S740 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005) (describing the effects of globalization on American culture and
business); Daniel Altman, Managing Globalization: Has it Hurt U.S. Workers?, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 17, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/17/business/glob18.php ("Looking at the
statistics, it is hard to argue that globalization has been a destructive force in the American labor
market."); Michael A. Fletcher, Globalization Requires Safety Net, U.N. Says, WASH. POST., Jul. 2,
2008, at D3 ("[g]reater government intervention is needed to moderate the severe economic swings
and inequalities that seem to be an unavoidable byproduct of globalization").
12 See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OF
THE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES (2001) (assessing the importance of intangible
assets in U.S. economic growth); Nir Kossovsky, Accounting for Intangibles: From IP to CEO, PAT.
STRATEGY & MGMT. Dec. 2007, at 3, 3 ("[A]mong the S&P 500 companies, intangible assets
represent anywhere from 60-80% of the market capitalization . . . ."); Mary Juetten, Pay Attention to
Innovation and Intangibles – They’re More than 80% of your Business’ Value, F ORBES .COM,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/maryjuetten/2014/10/02/pay-attention-to-innovation-and-intangiblesmore-than-80-of-your-business-value/ (Oct. 2, 2014)(noting that innovation and intellectual property
assets comprise 80% or more of a business’s assets).
13 See NIPLECC Report, supra note 4, at 45 ("Protecting IP . . . is crucial to increasing trade and
competing in the global economy.").
14 Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Voyeuristic Hacker, J. I NTERNET L., July 2007, at 1, 1 (noting that the
computer ushered in the Information Age).
15 See 2 JOHN J. FALVEY, JR. & AMY M. MCCALLEN, INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE §
26:6 (2008) ("The widespread use of the Internet, coupled with specific technologies that have
developed to facilitate copying, makes intellectual property theft easier than ever.").
16 Id. ("Growth in use of the Internet has also offered inviting opportunities for intellectual
property crimes.").
17 Id. ("[T]he Internet has also been used as a vehicle to facilitate the theft of trade secrets.").
10
11
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Computers facilitate the instant copying and transfer of proprietary information
surreptitiously. 18 One can download trade secret information from the company's
computer to a thumb drive or other media, transfer proprietary information to other
computers, upload proprietary information to the Internet, and transmit the purloined
information anywhere in the world within minutes.19 The receiving party can do the
same thing -- and the cycle can be repeated -- over and over again.20 Within days or
even hours, a U.S. company can lose complete control over its trade secret assets
forever. 21
Before the EEA, federal prosecutors relied primarily upon the National Stolen
Property Act22 and the wire and mail fraud statutes to commence criminal prosecutions
for trade secret theft. Both statutes were ineffective. 23 On the day the EEA was
enacted, President Clinton issued the following statement: 24
Trade secrets are an integral part of virtually every sector of our economy and are
essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of critical industries operating

18

Id.

19 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Intellectual Property on the Internet, A Survey of
Issues,
https://web.archive.org/web/20030604133814/http://ecommerce.wipo.int/survey/html/index.html#_ftn
ref68 [hereinafter “WIPO Report”] (December 2002)( noting that users can make unlimited copi es,
virtually instantaneously).
20 Id. (calling the internet the “world’s biggest copy machine.”).
21 Albert P. Halluin & Lorelei P. Westin, Nanotechnology: The Importance of Intellectual Property
Rights in an Emerging Technology, 86 J. P AT. & T RADEMARK O FF. S OC' Y 220, 225 (2004):
Although trade secrets can be a powerful arsenal in the protection of intellectual
property rights, it is becoming more and more difficult to keep such knowledge
confidential. Because of the increased mobility of employees and the accessibility of
the internet, the ease of getting information makes trade secrets difficult to defend.
Few venture capital firms will risk placing investments on companies that rely
primarily on trade secrets. Because of the easy accessibility to important
information, many emerging technology companies rely on patents to protect their
intangible assets.
Id. at 225 (footnote omitted); See also Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information
Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. I LL. L. REV . 1151, 1154 (1996):
Perhaps most daunting for trade secret owners, however, is that they are powerless
to counter industrial espionage and underhanded tactics on the Internet to exploit
trade secrets, as even the strictest security measures in the workplace will not stop
an ill-intentioned employee from disclosing valuable trade secrets in cyberspace.
After all, with a little know-how and the use of any of a number of computers in a
multitude of locations, disclosing a secret in cyberspace takes a matter of seconds.
Id. at 1154; R. Mark Halligan, The Recently Enacted Economic Espionage Act, Which Makes
Trade Secret Theft a Federal Crime, Specifically Addresses Theft Perpetrated via the Internet, NAT' L
L.J., Dec. 9, 1996, at B6; see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the
Internet, 2007 WIS. L. REV . 1041, 1042-43 (2007) (noting that trade secrets that turn up on the Internet
are no longer secrets).
22 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2006).
23 See Rustad, supra note 4, at 465-66.
24 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Statement by the President (Oct. 11,
1996),
reprinted
in
1996
U.S.C.C.A.N.
4034,
4034-35,
available
at
http://archives.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/?u=101196-remarks-by-president-on-economicespionage-act-signing.htm.
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in the United States. Economic espionage and trade secret theft threaten our Nation's
national security and economic well-being.
Until today, federal law has not accorded appropriate or adequate protection to
trade secrets, making it difficult to prosecute thefts involving this type of information.
Law enforcement officials relied instead on antiquated laws that have not kept pace
with the technological advances of modern society. This Act establishes a
comprehensive and systemic approach to trade secret theft and economic espionage,
facilitating investigations and prosecutions.
This bill also strengthens protection for our national information infrastructure
by eliminating gaps in the criminal laws covering attacks against computers and the
information they contain. Importantly, it does so without impeding the development of
legitimate uses of the information infrastructure.
This Act will protect the trade secrets of all businesses operating in the United
States, foreign and domestic alike, from economic espionage and trade secret theft and
deter and punish those who would intrude into, damage, or steal from computer
networks. I am pleased to sign it into law. 25 The EEA is a watershed statute,
recognizing U.S. national and economic interests in protecting the trade secret assets
of U.S. companies. 26 However, the EEA is ineffective as just a criminal statute. This
was true in 2008 and remains critically so today in 2015.

III. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSSES
At the time of the original article in 2008, ASIS International (ASIS) is the largest
organization for security professionals with approximately 38,000 members
worldwide. 27 ASIS has conducted seven Trends in Proprietary Information Loss
Surveys over the past 17 years.28 "The resulting reports have been used by U.S.
government agencies and private entities." 29 The ASIS survey was considered the most
authoritative resource on proprietary information losses by U.S. companies and the
survey findings are relied upon by and cited in the Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage. 30
The ASIS Survey Report published in August 2007 was based upon a survey of a
144 respondents from a diverse array of U.S. businesses during the spring and summer
of 2006. 31 The results confirm that proprietary information losses are continuing and

Id.
142 CONG. REC. H10,461 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("In my opinion, our economic
interests should be seen as an integral part of [the country's] national security interests, because
America's standing in the world depends on its economic strength and productivity.").
27 ASIS International, About ASIS, https://www.asisonline.org/About -ASIS/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited May 23, 2015).
28 ASIS INTERNATIONAL, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS at 4 (2007),
available
at
https://web.archive.org/web/ 20071030203849/https://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf .
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1 (noting that the survey "has come to be recognized as the premier study of its kind");
Id. at 4 (noting that the survey "findings have been cited in the Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage").
31 Id. at 1.
25
26
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increasing both in the United States and abroad. 32 U.S. companies continue to suffer
major losses and 60% of the survey respondents with the requisite knowledge admitted
that attempted or actual trade secret theft occurred in their respective companies in
2005. 33 Moreover, most of the information reported to have been compromised was
physically located in the U.S. when the "compromise" occurred, but the major
beneficiaries of the theft were foreign entities. 34 The top three foreign countries
identified were China, Russia and India. 35 Deliberate and inadvertent actions of
current and former employees; the exploitation of trusted third-party relationships
(vendors, customers, joint ventures, subcontractors, outsourced providers); as well as
"social engineering" and the unauthorized use of data mining software all contributed
to proprietary information losses. 36 These losses ranged from less than $ 10,000 to
more than $ 5.5 million. 37
The FBI was also sounding a five-alarm fire. Former FBI Director Robert Mueller
testified that the ASIS estimate was grossly understated and estimated that as much
as $ 200 billion was lost by U.S. companies to economic espionage in 2002 alone. 38
Other credible sources estimated loss as high as $ 400 billion annually. 39
Now fast forward to 2015. Study after study, report after report, virtually every
agency and department of the government reports that trade secret theft is
accelerating.40 There is a confluence of factors at work emanating from the digital
environment in which we now live and work. 41 Advancements in technology, increased
Id. at 11 ("Despite measures to ameliorate risk, U.S. companies continue to suffer losses").
Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 24 (noting that "China, Russia, and India were identifi ed as the top intended non-U.S.
recipients of compromised information").
36 Id. at 3.
37 Id
38 Robert Mueller, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigations, Address at the National Press Club
Luncheon (June 20, 2003) ("Economic espionage is costing our U.S. businesses now more than $ 200
billion a year in the theft of intellectual property.").
39 O FFICE OF THE NAT’ L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE E XECUTIVE , Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage -- 2002 vii (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ 2002.pdf ("[T]he combined costs of foreign and domestic economic
espionage, including the theft of intellectual property, [may be] as high as $ 300 billion per year and
rising."); Rustad, supra note 4, at 466-67; Richard Krantz, Industrial Espionage Becomes Favorite Way
to
Achieve
Quick
Gains,
Voice
of
Am.
News,
April
29,
2005,
http://www.voanews.com/english/ archive/2005-04/2005-04-29-voa1.cfm ("The FBI's current estimate
for 2004 is a loss of somewhere between $ 130 billion and $ 330 billion. We characterize around 15 or
16 countries as having pretty aggressive programs targeting the United States," says [FBI
counterespionage official] Clayt Lemme."); but see O FFICE OF THE P RESIDENT OF THE UNITED S TATES,
Administration
Strategy
on
Mitigating
the
Theft
of
U.S.
Trade
Secrets
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the _theft_o
f_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [hereinafter Executive Office Trade Secret Summary](Feb. 2013)(noting that
“estimates from academic literature on the losses of economic espionage range so widely as to be
meaningless – from $2 billion to $400 billion annually – reflecting the scarcity of data and variety of
methods used to calculate losses.”).
40 Executive Office Trade Secret Summary, supra note 39 at 1; see also O FFICE OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE E XECUTIVE , Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets In Cyberspace
(November 2011) available at
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf
41
Jonathan
L.
Sulds,
Trade
Secret
Protection,
ASIS
O NLINE ,
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Trade-Secret-Protection.aspx (Nov. 1. 2011).
32
33
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mobility, globalization and sophisticated cyber-tools and devices all contribute as
catalysts for trade secret theft.42
The statistics are staggering. Last year, for example, the FBI sponsored a
campaign in nine U.S. cities with billboards stating: “$13 Billion Lost—Protect
America’s Trade Secrets.”43 National Security Agency Director General Keith
Alexander calls cyber-espionage “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” 44
Symantec places the cost of intellectual property theft for the U.S. economy at $250
billion a year.45 McAfee estimates global remediation costs at $1 trillion per year. 46 Not
a day goes by without another report of foreign economic espionage, computer attacks,
and trade secret theft.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has estimated that publically traded U.S.
companies own an estimated $5 trillion worth of trade secret assets. 47 Another recent
study by PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC) and the Center for Responsible Enterprise and
Trade (CREATe.org) estimates that the economic loss attributable to trade secret theft
is between 1% and 3% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. 48

IV. FEDERAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS
U.S. law protects patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. 49 There is a
civil cause of action under federal law for patent infringement. 50 There is a civil cause
of action under federal law for copyright infringement. 51 There is a civil cause of action
under federal law for trademark infringement. 52 There is not, however, a civil cause of
action under federal law for trade secret misappropriation. 53

Executive Office Trade Secret Summary, supra note 39 at 20.
F EDERAL BUREAU OF I NVESTIGATIONS , Economic Espionage. How to Spot A Possible Threat,
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/may/insider_051112/insider_051112 (May 11, 2012)
44 Keith Alexander, An Introduction by General Alexander, T HE NEXT W AVE , Vol. 19, No. 4,
https://www.nsa.gov/research/tnw/tnw194/article2.shtml (last visited May 24, 2015).
45
Rich Dandliker, Putting a face on Intellectual Property Theft, S YMANTEC,
https://www.nsa.gov/research/tnw/tnw194/article2.shtml (Jul. 11, 2012)
46 The Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, M CAFEE (July 2013) http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economicimpact-cybercrime.pdf.
47 UNITED S TATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE , The Case for Enhanced Protection of Trade Secrets
in
the
Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/Final%20TPP%20Trade%20
Secrets%208_0.pdf (last visited May 24, 2015).
48 P RICE WATERHOUSE COOPER,
Economic Impact of Trade Secret Theft: A Framework for
Companies to Safeguard Trade Secrets and Mitigate Potential Thre ats [hereinafter “PwC Report”]
(February
2014),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/Final%20TPP%20Trade%20
Secrets%208_0.pdf
49 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072 (2006) (trademarks); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101- 122
(copyrights); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (trade secrets); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-105, 161-164, 171-173 (patents).
50 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-73.
51 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05.
52 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-17.
53 Compare id., 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05, and 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-73, with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
42
43
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The reasons for the step-child treatment of trade secrets are historical. 54 Patents
and trademarks are the by-products of the Industrial Revolution. 55 Copyrights date
back to the invention of the printing press, if not earlier. 56 Trade secrets were viewed
at various times as unfair competition or quasi-contract rights with different labels
attached to such rights in law and equity.57
Even though the protection of confidential information dates back to Roman law, 58
and even though the birth of every patent starts out as a trade secret, 59 the fact
remains that trade secrets did not find a solid home in intellectual property law until
the seminal decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. in 1974. 60 Shortly thereafter,
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979. 61 The stage was now set. In 1984,

54 See Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24
S ANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH T ECH. L.J. 207, 213-14 (2008) ("Trade secret protection has been
based on a number of different legal theories: contract, property, fiduciary relationship, and unjust
enrichment. It is unclear whether trade secrets can be characterized as property rights in a manner
imilar to copyrights or patents." (footnotes omitted)); Michael P. Simpson, Note, Future of Innovation
Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism -- an Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV . 1121, 114044 (2005)(describing trade secrets protection evolving from a property right into the prevention of
unfair competition).
55 See Anne Gilson, et al., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03[3][a] (2008) (emphasizing the Industrial
Revolution further distanced consumers from manufactures and products, thus stronger trademark
protection was needed); Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J.
P AT. & T RADEMARK O FF. S OC' Y 5, 6 (1991) (stating that U.S. patent protection was strengthened by
the Industrial Revolution and laissez-faire economics); see also Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual
Property Protection or Protectionalism? Declaratory Judgment Use by Patent Owners Against
Prospective Infringers, 42 AM . U.L. REV . 239, 245 N.35 (1992) (highlighting the Industrial Revolution's
strengthening of patent protection).
56 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
57 Milton E. Babirak, Jr., The Maryland Uniform Trade Secret Act: A Critical Summary of the
Act and Case Law, 31 U. Balt. L. Rev. 181, 183 (2002) (stating that since the late Middle Ages any
trade secret protection was based on what would be considered as unfair competition); see Elizabeth
A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 42 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 1, 9 (2007):
Trade secret law is a branch of intellectual property law that most closely regulates
standards of commercial ethics, guides morality of the business world, and
underscores fair dealing. It is probably in part for this reason that trade secret law
is now codified in the Restatement of Unfair Competition rather than in the
Restatement of Torts.

Id. at P18 (footnotes omitted); Simpson, supra note 54, at 1142 (discussing trade secret law's
evolution into something similar to contract law).
58 William B. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L. REV . 507, 507 (1939);
Herbert David Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 437, 437
(1960); A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM . L.
REV . 837, 837-38 (1930).
59 James Pooley, Fifty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit: Looking Forward to the
Next Millenium: The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 T EMP. L. REV .1181, 1181 (1997).
60 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
61 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 530 (2005).
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the United States Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto held that a trade secret
asset was a property right protected by the United States Constitution. 62
Of course, it has been decades since the computer revolution began and we now
live in a completely different world where the protection of trade secret assets is of
paramount importance. 63 Whatever advantages the United States has achieved in the
development of the law of trade secrets will be lost if we do not deploy effective means
to protect trade secret assets. U.S. companies are victims of international trade secret
theft, and U.S. companies need access to the federal courts to protect trade secret assets.
There is no justification or policy interest today for depriving U.S. companies of
access to the federal courts to protect U.S. trade secret assets.

V. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
U.S. businesses are the creators and owners of trade secret assets. 64 U.S.
businesses are the victims of trade secret theft and foreign economic espionage. 65 U.S.
businesses have the fiduciary and statutory obligation to protect trade secret assets; 66
finally, U.S. corporations have the financial means and financial incentive to protect
trade secret assets. 67 The legislative history of the EEA recognizes that the protection

62 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (stating that a government taking of a trade secrets is governed by
the Fifth Amendment).
63 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4022-23 (stating
because trade secrets are vital to America's economy, they need to be protected for both national
economy and security reasons); 142 CONG. REC. H10,461 (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("In my opinion,
our economic interests should be seen as an integral part of [the country's] national security interests, because
America's standing in the world depends on its economic strength and productivity."); 142 CONG.
REC. S377 (1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen):
While the cost of politico-military espionage was reduced military security, and
damage from economic espionage comes in the form of billions of dollars annually
in lost international contracts, pirated products and stolen corporate propriet ary
information. The direct cost of this espionage is borne by America's international
corporations. The indirect costs are borne by the American economy as a whole -jobs and profits are lost; the competitive edge is stolen away.
142 CONG. REC. S377.
64 Scott Stewart, At Work, Can You Keep What You A Trade Secret?, S T. L OUIS P OST-D ISPATCH,
Apr. 20, 2008, at E7 (articulating that businesses put significant efforts into creating intellectual
property but fail to put the same effort into protecting that intellectual property).
65 142 CONG. REC. S377 (1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen) ("The direct cost of this espionage is
borne by America's international corporations."); see, e.g., Engineer Who Tried to Sell Secrets to China
Gets 24 Months, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 2008, § 3, at 4 (reporting that a former employee of the U.S.
company Quantum 3D Inc. tried to give trade secrets to the Chinese government and was sentenced
to 24 months of jail under the EEA).
66 R. MARK HALLIGAN & RICHARD F. WEYAND, TRADE SECRET ASSET MANAGEMENT:
AN EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION ASSET MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING
SARBANES -OXLEY ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR TRADE SECRETS 137-144 (2006).
67 Czapracka, supra note 54, at 211 ("Trade secrets provide an economic incentive for private
investment in knowledge production by giving the means to exclude others from using that knowledge
and thus increasing the expected returns of innovation." (footnote omitted)); see Atkins, supra note
21, at 1174. Because a trade secret's value is diluted if a business does not actively protect it, a
business will use reasonable means to protect its trade secrets. Id. at 1193-94.
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of trade secret assets is in the national interest of the United States. 68 Depriving U.S.
companies from access to the federal courts under the EEA to protect trade secret
assets is crippling U.S. companies in the New Economy.69
Trade secret assets are the backbone of an information-based economy. 70 Trade
secrets no longer comprise some paper files locked in a file cabinet in technology
department. Today, trade secret assets and other intangible assets comprise over 80%
of new economy companies and reside in computers and networks all over the world. 71
Trade secret assets are critical to the competitiveness of companies creating jobs
in the United States and abroad.72 The creation of trade secrets means the creation of
jobs; conversely, the loss of trade secret assets means the loss of jobs.73 Focusing on
the types of offenders does not change this fundamental equation. Whether the
offender is an insider, a foreign intelligence service, a corporate competitor, or a
transnational criminal organization, the effects of trade secret misappropriation are
the same. 74
Looking back another 25 years from now, it will undoubtedly be a historical
footnote that the United States compromised and lost billions of dollars of wealth in
trade secret assets because there was no federal cause of action to protect against the
actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets and no statutory provisions for
civil ex parte seizure orders to preserve evidence and to prevent the transfer of U.S.
trade secret assets outside the United States.
Not surprisingly, there is now strong bipartisan support and strong corporate
support for the two proposed amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. 75
Various proposals have been proposed and vetted by the American Bar Association
(ABA), the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the Intellectual
Property Owners Association (IPO) and there have been daily blogs recognizing that

68 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4022-23 (stating
because trade secrets are vital to America's economy, they need to be protected for both national
economy and security reasons); 142 CONG. REC. H10,461 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("In my
opinion, our economic interests should be seen as an integral part of [the country's] national security
interests, because America's standing in the world depends on its economic strength and
productivity.").
69
See
Kevin
Kelly,
New
Rules
for
the
New
Economy,
WIRED. COM
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/5.09/newrules_pr.html (last visited May 28, 2015)(noting that
the term “new economy” was first mentioned in 1969, marking the beginning of “knowledge workers,”
and is often referred to as the “Information Economy”).
70 “Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate for Today’s Threats?”
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime and Terrorism of the Judiciary Committee, 114th Cong. (May
13, 2014)(S tatement of Douglas K. Norman).
71 Executive Office Trade Secret Summary, supra note 39 at 20, Juetten, supra note 12.
72 See Michael B.G. Froman, 2015 Special 301 Report, UNITED S TATES T RADE REPRESENTATIVE
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-FINAL.pdf (April 2015)
73 Id. (noting that an estimated 40 million U.S. jobs directly or indirectly rely on intellectual
property intensive industries).
74 See generally PwC, supra note 48 (discussing the undifferentiated effects of trade secret theft).
75 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter DTSA],
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2267/text (last visited May 25,
2014); Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter TSPA],
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5233/text (last visited May 25,
2015).
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these two critical amendments must be enacted to protect U.S. companies and U.S.
economic interests.76
Recently, a law review article was published entitled “Here Come the Trade Secret
Trolls” by David S. Levine and Sharon K. Sandeen raising for the first time the
possibility that a new type of entity—which the authors call a “trade secret troll”—
could emerge if the Congress amends the EEA to provide a private cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation and statutory procedures for ex parte seizure orders.77
The academic exercise of attempting to conflate a “patent troll” with a nonexistent possibility of the emergence of a “trade secret troll” is nonsense and ignores
the historical development of trade secrets law in the United States over 200 years and
almost 40 years of development of statutory case law under the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act. Where are the trade secret trolls now or in the past?
So-called patent trolls (or non-practicing entities), some argue, purchase issued
patents to file frivolous patent infringement lawsuits hoping to secure a quick-payday
settlement because defendants want to avoid an expensive patent infringement
lawsuit. There is no evidence of this alleged frivolous misconduct in trade secrets law.
A trade secret is a fragile asset that exists as a trade secret because reasonable
measures are being actively taken to protect the secrecy of the information and the
owner of the trade secret is deriving economic value from the secrecy of the trade
secret.
There is no registration system in trade secrets law; trade secrets cannot be
bundled like a portfolio of patents. Establishing a prima facie case for trade secret
misappropriation is not as simple as attached a publically issued patent as an exhibit
to a federal complaint for patent infringement. Proving up a cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation is a complex legal task; an identification of the alleged trade
secret with particularity is required; a six-factor examination of the alleged trade
secret is required; the reasonable measures taken to protect the alleged trade secret
must be disclosed and proven up for that trade secret; then moving to the
misappropriation analysis, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached a
confidential relationship or used other improper means to acquire the trade secret, and
then, made an unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret resulting in damages.
Any trial lawyer (including this author) who has tried both patent and trade secrets
cases will tell you without hesitation that trade secret cases are more difficult cases
than patent infringement cases.
One of the key provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is Section 4—
“Attorney’s Fees.”78 This section provides that if a claim of misappropriation is made
in bad faith, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees.79 The courts have
76 See Wayne P. Sobon, AIPLA Support for H.R. 5233, the Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014
(September
9,
2014),
http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/congress/Documents/AIPLA%20Letter%20Supporting%20HR5233%2
0Trade%20Secret%209-9-2014.pdf; Lisa A. Dunner, Letter to Representative Kevin McCarthy (October
16,
2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advocacy/ad
vocacy-20141016-comments-hr5233.authcheckdam.pdf
77 David S. Levine and Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 W ASH & L EE
L. REV . O NLINE 230 (2015), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss4/3
78 Id. § 4.
79 Id.
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construed this provision to award attorney’s fees if a complaint for trade secret
misappropriation is filed in bad faith or if, after discovery, the Plaintiff continues to
maintain and prosecute the specious trade secret misappropriation claim in bad
faith. 80 The “bad faith” provision has deterred abuses for over 40 years and enacting a
federal civil cause of action under the EEA will not change that because the recovery
of attorney’s fees for bad faith prosecution of a trade secret misappropriation claim will
be incorporated in the EEA amendments. 81

VI. THE EEA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Economic Espionage Act is divided into two sections: Section 1831 (economic
espionage by foreign governments, foreign instrumentalities or foreign agents) and
Section 1832 (trade secret theft). 82 This article proposes amendments to the EEA that
will create a private cause of action under Section 1832; however there will be no
amendments to the EEA relating to Section 1831 violations.

A. Prohibited Acts
Both sections 1831 and 1832 of the EEA prohibit the same misconduct regarding
trade secrets, punishing anyone who:
. "[S]teals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information;" 83
. "[W]ithout authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs,
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits,
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information;" 84
. "[R]eceives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization. " 85
The EEA does not prohibit legitimate means of obtaining information, such as
reverse engineering or independent development. 86 Moreover, the EEA was not
80 Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 277 Fed.Appx. 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2008)(awarding
attorneys fees under Michigan trade secrets statute); FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal.A pp.4th
1270, 1276 (2009)(noting that an award of attorneys’ fees is proper under California statute is the
claim is groundless or if the claim is pursued “beyond a point where the plaintiff no longer believes
the case has merit.”).
81 See TSPA, supra note 75.
82 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006) (entitled "Economic Espionage"); id. § 1832 (entitled "Theft of Trade
Secrets").
83 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1).
84 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2).
85 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(3).
86 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,213 (1996) (Manager's Statement for H.R. 3723, The Economic
Espionage Act) ("If someone has lawfully gained access to a trade secret and can replicate it without
violating copyright, patent or [the EEA], then that form of 'reverse engineering' should be fine.").
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intended to deny an employee the inherent right to use of general knowledge, skills, or
experience derived from his or her tenure with a particular company. 87
The EEA also makes it a federal offense to receive, buy or possess the trade secret
information of another person knowing that such information was stolen,
appropriated, obtained or converted without the trade secret owner's authorization. 88
The EEA's definition of "trade secret" is derived from the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act ("UTSA") but has been updated to reflect the realities of the electronic environment
where proprietary information assets now often exist:
[T]he term "trade secret" means all forms and types on financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether
or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if -(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, the public. 89
Conspiracies and attempted thefts are also proscribed by the EEA. 90 The same
types of penalties apply with increased penalties imposed if the trade secret
misappropriation benefits a foreign government, foreign instrumentality or foreign
agent. 91
The EEA also provides for forfeiture to the United States of any property
constituting or derived from the proceeds of violations of the act and the forfeiture of
Independent, or parallel creation, is not prohibited by the EEA. Id. at S12,212; Id. at S10,886
(statement of Sen. Kohl) ("Reverse engineering is a broad term that encompasses a variety of actions.
The important thing is to focus on whether the accused committed one of the prohibited acts of this
statute rather than whether he or she has 'reverse engineered.'"); Id. at H10,462 (statement of Rep.
Schumer) ("[R]everse engineering is an entirely legitimate practice."). But see James H.A. Pooley,
Mark A. Lemley, & Peter J. Toren, Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 T EX. I NTELL.
P ROP. L.J. 177, 195 (1997) ("While reverse engineering is not expressly prohibited under [18 U.S.C. §
1831(a)(2)], neither is it expressly permitted."). The EEA does not expressly state reverse engineering
is allowed. Id., at 195. Therefore, some forms of reverse engineering may be prohibited if the acts
involved are unlawful under the EEA. Id.; see also Darren S. Tucker, Comment, The Federal
Government's War on Economic Espionage, 18 U. P A. J. I NT' L E CON. L. 1109, 1143 (1997) (discussing
whether reverse engineering and independent creation is allowed under EEA).
87 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,213 (1996) (Manager's Statement for H.R. 3723, The Economic
Espionage Act) ("[T]he government cannot prosecute an individual for taking advantage of the general
knowledge and skills or experience that he or she obtains or comes by during his tenure with a
company."); id. at H10,462 (statement of Rep. Schumer) ("[S]ome Members thought that this
legislation might inhibit common and acceptable business practices. For example, employees who
leave one company to work for another naturally take their general knowledge and experience with
them and no one, no one wishes to see them penalized as a result."); see also Tucker, supra note 86, at
1143.
88 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(3); id. § 1832(a)(3).
89 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). Compare id. (defining "trade secret" under the EEA), with UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (defining "trade secret" under the UTSA).
90 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5); id. § 1832(a)(3).
91 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a). Compare id. § 1832(a)(providing a maximum penalty of a fine and 15 years
imprisonment), with id. § 1832(a) (providing a maximum penalty of a fine and 10 years imprisonment).
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any property used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate
a violation of the act. 92
The EEA authorizes the attorney general, deputy attorney general or assistant
attorney general in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department to apply for a
federal court order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral
communications by the FBI or other federal agencies having responsibility for the
investigation of the offense. 93 These are the same investigative tools available in other
federal criminal prosecutions. 94
The EEA also applies to offenses committed outside the United States if the
offender is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States, if the corporation
or other organization was incorporated or organized in the United States, or if an act
in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States. 95 These
extraterritorial provisions are critical to deter international theft and to prevent willful
evasion of liability for trade secret misappropriation by using the Internet or other
means to transfer the proprietary information outside the United States.
In any prosecution or other proceeding under the EEA, the court is required to
issue protective orders and to take such other action necessary to preserve the
confidentiality of the trade secrets consistent with the federal rules of criminal and
civil procedure. 96 The attorney general is authorized to commence civil actions to
obtain injunctive relief to protect the trade secret owner from any violations or further
violations of the act. 97
The EEA does not displace any other remedies, civil or criminal, relating to the
misappropriation or theft of trade secrets or the lawful disclosure of information
required by law or necessary actions by a government entity of the United States, a
state or political subdivision or a state. 98

18 U.S.C. § 1834(a).
Id. § 2516(1)(a).
94 Id. (providing for interception of wire or oral communications for a myriad of federal crimes);
see generally 28 U.S.C. § 533 (discussing the U.S. Attorney General's power to appoint officials to
conduct and carry out investigations).
95 18 U.S.C. § 1837.
92
93

96

Id. § 1835; 142 CONG. REC. H10,461 (1996) (Statement of Rep. Buyer):
Another obstacle to enforcing these crimes under existing law is that there is no
statutory procedure in place to protect the victim's stolen information during
criminal proceedings. As a result, victims are often reluctant to prosecute for fear
that the prosecution itself will further disseminate the economic information stolen
from them.

Id.
97 Id. § 1836.
98 Id. § 1838.
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VII. PROSECUTION U NDER THE EEA
At the time of the original law review article in 2008, there had been less than
sixty prosecutions, mainly Section 1832 prosecutions. 99 Most of these prosecutions
were filed in the Northern District of California. 100 In fact, Justice Department
statistics confirm that approximately 80% of the eighty six federal judicial districts
nationwide have had no EEA prosecutions. 101
Recently, Peter Toren went back and collected updated statistics for the 16-year
period from 1996 to 2012. 102 During this period, the total number of EEA indictments
comes to only 124—less than 8 indictments a year on average. 103 The statistics reveal
that the number of indictments has remained relatively flat with no dramatic increases
since the enactment of the EEA.104
It is instructive that the United States recognized—at the birth of the Internet
revolution—that the protection of trade secrets was in the economic and national
security interest of the United States.105 But Congress failed to include a private civil
cause of action in the original Act based on the same “fears” now being posited by
academics today that somehow providing the victims of trade secret theft with access
to the federal courts will somehow tip the scales against employee mobility and create
a chilling effect on businesses competing in the marketplace. 106 In fact, just the
opposite has occurred. Trade secret theft and economic espionage are crippling the U.S.
economy and causing the loss of jobs, inhibiting employee mobility, and unfair
competition in the marketplace. 107
The reality is that the EEA as solely a criminal statute has not deterred theft and
foreign economic espionage. 108 The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section

99 Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the
Economic Espionage Act, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 389, 432 (2006) (stating that as of 2006, there have
been forty-seven people prosecuted in thirty-four cases under the Economic Espionage Act).
100 See Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Trade
Secret/Economic
Espionage
Cases,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110228154211/http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipcases.htm
l#operations (last visited May 24, 2015)(showing that many of the recent U. S. Department of Justice
Economic Espionage Act prosecutions are in the No rthern District of California).
101 See id. (listing only sixteen different federal circuit courts handling cases involving the EEA).
102
Peter Toren, A Look
At 16 Years
of EEA Prosecutions, L AW
360,
http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at-16-years-of-eea-prosecutions (September 19, 2012,
12:18 PM).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4022-23 (stating
because trade secrets are vital to America's economy, they need to be protected for both national
economy and security reasons); 142 CONG. REC. H10,461 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("In my
opinion, our economic interests should be seen as an integral part of [the country's] national security
interests, because America's standing in the world depends on its economi c strength and
productivity.").
106 See Levine, supra note 77; see also Dave Levine, The Dangers of the New Trade Secret Act,
F REEDOM T O T INKER, https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/davelevine/the-dangers-of-the-new-tradesecrets-acts/ (Aug. 27, 2014).
107 See generally, PwC Report, supra note 48.
108 Trade Secrets: Promoting and Protecting American Innovation, Competitiveness, and Market
Access in Foreign Markets, Hearing before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intell. Prop. And the Internet of
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of the United States Department of Justice has done an excellent job, but the burden
on the government is too great. Without a federal civil cause of action, U.S. companies
simply cannot adequately protect U.S. trade secret assets in a worldwide economy that
now crosses international boundaries.

VIII. N O PREEMPTION
The amendments to the EEA proposed in this article should not preempt either
the UTSA or the common law. The law of trade secrets has developed over many
centuries and should not be displaced. 109 Once again, academics and others have
confused this critical jurisdictional issue. 110 The law of trade secrets can be traced back
to Roman times. 111 For almost 200 years the law of trade secrets has grown under the
common law and in the past 40 years the common law has been captured and refined
in UTSA decisions culminating in the Restatement Third of Unfair Competition in
1995 recognizing that the modern-day definition of a trade secret protects any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage
over others.112
The uniformity/no-uniformity argument of academics and law professors is a red
herring. The modern day cause of action for trade secret misappropriation and the
remedies available for trade secret misappropriation are well-defined. 113 The EEA was
built upon the UTSA and any suggestion that adding a private civil cause of action to
the EEA will undermine or seriously disrupt trade secrets law is simply wrong.
Take for example the decision by the Federal Circuit in Tianrui Group Co. v.
ITC. 114 The case involved the misappropriation of Amsted’s trade secrets used to
manufacture cast steel railway wheels.115 After a 10-day evidentiary hearing, the ITC
found that TianRui, a Chinese company, had hired employees from Amsted’s Chinese
foundries and misappropriated 128 Amsted trade secrets.116 The ITC issued a Section
337 limited exclusion order and the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC.117

the Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. at 9 (Jun. 24, 2014)(“Since enactment of the Economic Espionage
Act, the problem with trade secret theft has grown dramatically.”).
109 1 MELVIN. F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1:3 (2008) (discussing how the concept of
protecting trade secrets can be traced back to the ancient Romans).
110 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005).
111 See Jager, supra note 109; see also Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth
Exploded,
11
T UL.
E UR.
&
CIV .
L.F.
19,
20
(1996),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/476 (discussing
the
cause
of action for
misappropriation of trade secrets in Roman law).
112 See generally Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets In Anglo -American Law:
An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV . 313 (1997)(providing historical development of trade secret
law up to adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition).
113 Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 897 (Del. 2002).
114 661 F.3d 1322, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
115 Id. at 1324.
116 Id. at 1325.
117 Id. at 1326.
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During the ITC proceedings, the ITC relied on the Illinois Uniform Trade Secrets
Act for the adjudication of the “trade secret” and “misappropriation” claims.118 On
appeal, TianRui argued that state trade secret law should not apply to an ITC section
337 proceeding.119 In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit agreed that a single
federal standard, rather than the law of a particular state, should determine what
constitutes misappropriation of a trade secret sufficient to establish an "unfair method
of competition" under section 337. Citing the Restatement Third of Unfair
Competition, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
the Court readily identified a consonance in the general principles of trade secret law.
There was no dispute about the substantive law of trade secrets. The Federal Circuit
therefore affirmed the decision by the FTC under the generally recognized law of trade
secrets. 120 Once again, the law of trade secrets in the United States is well defined and
access to our federal courts will ensure that the modern law of trade secrets grows and
thrives in the digital age.121 The suggestion by some academics that a federal civil
cause of action will weaken or destroy U.S. trade secrets law is fallacious.
The UTSA will often be the cause of action of choice where federal jurisdiction is
not absolutely necessary. 122 Original jurisdiction is not unusual and original
jurisdiction will preserve and build upon the historical and modern developments in
U.S. trade secret law. The Lanham Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act are
two other federal statutes built upon original not exclusive jurisdiction. 123

IX. N ATIONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
The federal courts provide for national service of process. 124 This procedural
advantage is critical in trade secrets litigation. Often the plaintiff resides in one state;
the defendant resides in another; and the evidence of misappropriation and critical
witnesses are in different states around the country. 125
Faced with this situation, a skilled trade secrets practitioner looks for a way to
bring the case in federal court so he can serve nationwide subpoenas and proceed with
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1326-27.
120 Tianrui Group Co., 661 F.3d at 1327.
121 Trade Secrets: Promoting and Protecting American Innovation, Competitiveness, and Market
Access in Foreign Markets, Hearing before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intell. Prop. And the Internet of
the Judiciary Comm. 113th Cong. at 9 (Jun. 24, 2014) National Association of Manufacturers’ Senior
Director, Chris Moore, testified that the lack of a civil cause of action for trade secret theft leaves
small businesses “without an essential means to deter theft and recover losses,” and that “it makes it
harder for the United States to lead internationally to improve trade secret protection.” Id. at 44.
122 See Paul Hanna and Matthew Leal, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: An Attractive but
Risky Alternative to Texas Trade Secret Law, 45 S T. M ARY’ S L.J. 491, 492-493 (2014)(noting that in
2013, when Texas adopted the UTSA, it joined the 46 other states that had already done so); see
generally, Sarah Boyer, Current Issues in Public Policy: Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A busing
Federal Jurisdiction?, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y. 661 (2009).
123 Anne Hiaring, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK
LAW 2008, at 51, 56-57 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook
Series No. 939, 2008); Kardex Sys., Inc. v. Sistemco N.V., 583 F.Supp. 803, 810 n.3 (D. Me. 1984) ("The
Lanham Act does not preempt state efforts to establish and protect rights in trademarks.").
124 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006) (providing for national service of process in all civil actions).
125 See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995).
118
119

[14:476 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

494

discovery anywhere in the country. 126 But securing federal jurisdiction is difficult.
Unless there is diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there is no way to obtain
subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts without a federal cause of action (28
U.S.C. § 1331) and pendent jurisdiction of the state-based trade secret claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 127 This explains why trade secret litigators are now filing federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") claims which establish original subject
matter jurisdiction over the CFAA claim and supplemental or pendent jurisdiction of
the related state law (UTSA) claims. 128
The difficulties in litigating a national trade secrets dispute under a state-based
statute cannot be overemphasized. Take a simple example: suppose the trade secrets
case is pending in state court in Illinois and discovery establishes that a critical witness
with potentially smoking-gun evidence resides in California. The first step required is
the filing of a motion in Illinois state court requesting the Illinois court to issue a
discovery petition authorizing the out-of-state deposition. 129 After obtaining the
Illinois court order, a special action must then be filed in California to obtain a court
order from the California court under the doctrine of comity among states to authorize
the valid issuance of the subpoena in California to the California resident. 130 The whole
process can take months with briefings both in the Illinois courts and the California
courts. 131
Amending the EEA to add a private civil cause of action will instantly eliminate
all these procedural hurdles and delays. Subpoenas can be issued nationwide by trial
counsel in federal court litigation. 132 Trade secret cases are time sensitive -- "[a] trade
secret once lost is, of course, lost forever.”133 This procedural advantage alone, without
more, merits amendments to the EEA.

X. EX PARTE SEIZURE ORDERS
Another advantage of the proposed EEA amendments would be the statutory
recognition of civil ex parte orders in trade secret misappropriation lawsuits. 134 Once

126 See Roy E. Hofer & Susan F. Gullotti, Presenting the Trade Secret Owner's Case, in
PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1985, at 145, 160-61 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 196, 1985).
127 Id. at 159-60.
128 Victoria A. Cundiff, Protecting Trade Secrets in a Digital World, in INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY LAW INSTITUTE 2008: NEW DIRECTIONS: SOCIAL NETWORKS, BLOGS,
PRIVACY, MASH-UPS, VIRTUAL WORLDS AND OPEN SOURCE, at 723, 731-32 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 929, 2008).
129 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(o).
130 U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. CAL. R. 30-250(a).
131 Mark C. Dillon, Obtaining Out-of-State Witnesses and Documents for Discovery and Trial, 28
WESTCHESTER B.J. 13, 14 (2001) (noting that practitioners are at the mercy of foreign courts in these
matters).
132 Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the Screenname: Handling Information Requests Relating
to Electronic Communications, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE, at 953, 97273 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 754, 2003).
133 FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., Ltd., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
134 See Mark L. Krotoski, The Time is Ripe for New Federal Civil Trade Secret Law, BLOOMBERG
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (December 3, 2014), http://www.bna.com/time-ripe-new-
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again, in today's environment, trade secrets can be transferred to foreign countries and
other parts of the world in seconds. 135 The traditional process of notice to the defendant
and opportunity to be heard do not work well in trade secret cases because the
defendants can hide or destroy the purloined trade secret assets in seconds. 136 To
preserve the status quo and to preserve the evidence, courts must have clear statutory
authority to issue ex parte seizure orders in trade secret cases.
However, there must be safeguards to protect against any abuse of the statutory
provision authorizing ex parte seizure orders. For example, the final House version
(H.R. 5233) set forth 7 requirements that must be met for the issuance of an ex parte
seizure order as well as the Court issue a written order with required findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a hearing set not later than 7 days after the issuance of the
order. 137 The party seeking the order must also post a bond and there are separate
provisions for the recovery of damages for excessive or wrongful seizure.138

XI. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Because trade secret assets can be stolen and transferred anywhere in the world,
the trade secret owner needs the protection of the United States Constitution to the
fullest extent possible. 139 The Congress of the United States recognized this with the
passage of the EEA and provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction to encompass
misconduct occurring outside the United States within the outer limits of the U.S.
Constitution140 reigning in (1) offenders committing wrongful acts outside the United
States if they are citizens, permanent resident aliens, or entities organized under the
law of the United States141 and (2) wrongful conduct if any acts in furtherance of the
offense occurred in the United States. 142
The proposed amendments to the EEA would extend the benefits of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to EEA civil actions which, in turn, will provide significant
new protection against the rampant economic espionage attacks directed toward U.S.
companies.

n17179917951/ (noting that both the DTSA and TSPA contain civil ex parte seizure provisions, to
eliminate the current “catch me if you can” environment of economic espionage).
135 See WIPO Report, supra note 19.
136 See id.; see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE F OREST L. REV . 1, 3-4 (2007) (noting that the power of the Internet
exponentially magnifies the risk of trade secret disclosure).
137 See TSPA, supra note 75.
138 Id.
139 See Ian C. Ballon, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET -COMMERCE, FREE SPEECH,
SECURITY, OBSENITY AND ENTERTAINMENT, at 755, 760-61 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 471, 1997).
140 Id. at 761-62.
141 18 U.S.C. § 1837(1) (2006); Ballon, supra note 139, at 761-62.
142 18 U.S.C. § 1837(2); Ballon, supra note 139, at 761-62.
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XII. U NIFORMITY
There has been much discussion regarding the lack of uniformity in state trade
secret laws. 143 This author does not share this view; the UTSA has, for the most part,
resulted in a very coherent and consistent body of trade secrets law -- what constitutes
a "trade secret" is now defined by statute; 144 what constitutes "misappropriation" is
now defined by statute; 145 there is a uniform statute of limitations; 146 statutory
standards for injunctive relief; 147 109 statutory provisions for compensatory
damages148 110 and so on. 149
However, there are still some glaring holes and discrepancies. 150 New York, for
example, has never enacted the UTSA. Massachusetts has not enacted the UTSA
either. 151 There are other state variances requiring U.S. courts to address choice of law
questions in most national trade secret cases. 152 Adding a private cause of action to the
EEA will provide the courts with the opportunity to develop a more uniform approach
to trade secrets derived from the unique national and international perspective of the
federal courts. U.S. companies now compete in a global marketplace; a national and
international perspective is now required for the protection of trade secret assets. 153
143 E.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV . J. L AW &
T ECH. 427, 442 (1995) ("The best reason enacting federal legislation to displace state law on trade
secret misappropriation is the need for national uniformity in this area of law."); Christopher A. Ruhl,
Corporate and Economic Espionage: A Model Penal Approach for Legal Deterrence to Theft of
Corporate Trade Secrets and Proprietary Business Information, 33 V AL. U. L. REV . 763, 801 (1999).
144 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
145 Id. § 1(2).
146 Id. § 6.
147 Id. § 2.
148 Id. § 3.
149 See id. §§ 1-12.
150 See Pace, supra note143, at 442-43 ("[E]very state protects a business' trade secrets from
misappropriation, and the vast majority do so via the adoption of state statutes based on the UTSA.
Yet, despite this universal recognition and near-universal origin of trade secrets protection, states
vary widely in their treatment of trade secret misappropriation."). The UTSA has been adopted by
forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 14 U.L.A. at 18-19 (Supp. 2008);
see Julie Piper, Comment, I Have A Secret?: Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Confidential
Information that does not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret Status, 12 M ARQ. I NTELL. P ROP. L. REV.
359, 360 (2008) (discussing the history and development of trade secret law as interpreted and adopted
by different states).
151 Michael J. Hutter, The Case for Adoption of a Uniform Trade Secrets Act in New York, 10 ALB.
L.J. S CI . & T ECH. 1, 6-8 (1999) (noting the advantages for New York enacting the USTA); Pace, supra
note 143, at 443 (noting that New York continues to prefer the Restatement approach to trade secret
misappropriation).
152 See Hutter, supra note 151, at 6-8; Pace, supra note 143, at 443; Allyson A. McKenzie, United
States v. Kai-Lo Hsu: An Examination of the Confidentiality Provision in the Economic Espionage Act:
Is it Suitable to Maintain the Use and Effectiveness of the EEA?, 25 D EL. J. CORP. L. 309, 314 (2000)
(noting that different laws among the states create choice of law questions).
153 142 CONG. REC. S740 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("It would not be unfair to say that
America has become a full-service shopping mall for foreign governments and companies who want to
jump start their businesses with stolen trade secrets."); Id. at S377 (statement of Sen. Cohen):
While the cost of politico-military espionage was reduced military security, and
damage from economic espionage comes in the form of billions of dollars annually
in lost international contracts, pirated products and stolen corporate proprietary
information. The direct cost of this espionage is borne by America's international
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XIII. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The United States has entered into numerous international agreements and many
of these agreements require the member countries to protect intellectual property
rights. 154
The two most significant examples of this trend are the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")155
and the Agreement Establishing World Trade
Organization ("WTO") which resulted from the Uruguay Round Talks under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the WTO/GATT Agreement
entitled Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 156
Both NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement require national standards for trade
secret protection. 157 However the United States has not enacted a federal statute to
protect trade secrets; states like New York, Massachusetts, Texas do not even have a
state trade secrets statute. 158 So the prevailing argument in the international
community goes something like this: if the United States does not have a federal civil
statute to protect trade secrets, why should we be held to a higher standard in our
respective countries? This argument is well taken; although the US recognized the
important national interest in the protection of trade secret assets with the passage of
the EEA in 1996; we are long overdue for the enactment of a federal trade secrets
statute. These goals can be accomplished quickly and efficiently by enacting the
proposed amendments to the EEA. The United States leads the world in research and
development. Historically, this has been due to a strong patent system. 159 However,
in the Information Age, we also need a strong regime for the protection of trade secret
assets. These critical amendments to the EEA will show the world that we are the
leader in the protection of these critical intellectual property assets and it will jumpstart the rest of the world in moving in the same direction to harmonize the moder n
law of trade secrets.
corporations. The indirect costs are borne by the American economy as a whole jobs and profits are lost; the competitive edge is stolen away.
142 CONG. REC. S377 (1996); see generally MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Thomson/West 2007) (detailing the various trade secret rules and
laws in effect internationally).
154 See Michael W. Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property
Law, 55 AM . U. L. REV . 845, 863 n.67 (2006) (listing various examples, including the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works); Pace, supra note 143, at 450-453; Spencer Weber
Waller & Noel J. Byrne, Changing View of Intellectual Property and Competition Law in the European
Community and the United States of America, 20 BROOK. J. I NT' L L. 1, 8 (1993).
155 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. -Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA]; Pace, supra note 143143, at 450.
156 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 365, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M
1197 [hereinafter TRIPs]; see Pace, supra note 143, at 450.
157 TRIPs, supra note 156; NAFTA, supra note 155; see Pace, supra note 143, at 450.
158 See McKenzie, supra note 152, at 314; Pace, supra note 143, at 443, 451-52.
159 See Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation , 71
S T. JOHN’ S L. REV . 329, 329-335 (1997)(discussing the historical policy goals of patent protection and
analyzing in light of current health care legislation, stating that the current patent system
“encourages innovation and new consumer goods and trade benefits.”).
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Other countries are also coming to the realization that trade secret assets may, in
many instances, be the intellectual property asset of choice in the New Economy. 160
The European Union has studied trade secrets extensively and the studies and surveys
show that 75% of respondents in a business survey ranked trade secrets as
strategically important to their company’s growth, competitiveness and innovative
performance. 161
On November 28 2013, the European Commission (the "Commission") announced
a proposal for a Directive on Trade Secrets and Confidential Information which is now
making its way through the European Parliament. 162
Trade secrets and economic espionage are also intertwined in the TPP and TTIP
negotiations.163 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional regulatory
and investment treaty. 164 As of 2014, twelve countries throughout the Asia-Pacific
region have participated in negotiations on the TPP: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and
Vietnam. 165 In turn, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
involves EU-US negotiations.166 In both negotiations, there have been discussions
about protecting trade secrets in computer systems.167
These developments demand that the United States step forward and show strong
leadership regarding trade secret asset management in the 21st Century. Adopting
the proposed EEA amendments will accomplish this role for the United States in these
worldwide negotiations immediately.

160 See Trade Secrets, E UROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectualproperty/trade-secrets/index_en.htm (Updated May 22, 2015)(noting that in an economy where
information, knowledge, and inventiveness are the raw materials, trade secret protection is beneficial
for large companies able to develop large IP portfolios, as well as small companies unable to protect
their IP through formal channels).
161 Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market ,
E UROPEAN
COMMISSION
(April
2013),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade -secrets/130711_final-study_en.pdf.
162 See Theresa Papademetriou, European Union: Draft Directive on the Protection of Trade
Secrets,
L IBRARY
OF
CONGRESS
(Jun.
12,
2014)
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404026_text .
163 See O FFICE OF THE UNITED S TATES T RADE REPRESENTATIVE , https://ustr.gov/tpp/outlines-ofTPP [hereinafter TPP Outlines](last visited May 25, 2015); E UROPEAN COMMISSION [hereinafter TTIP
Factsheet], http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/contents/ (last visited May 27,
2015).
164 See TPP Outlines, supra note 163.
165 Id.
166 See TTIP Factsheet, supra note 163.
167 Id.; TPP Outlines, supra note 163.

[14:476 2015] Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets:
Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996

499

XIV. MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRET ASSETS
There were many fears when the EEA was enacted. 168 A major concern was that
aggressive business competition would be exposed to EEA criminal indictment. 169 This
has not happened. 170 The EEA is a well-drafted statute with built-in safeguards that
prevent abuse. There is also strong legislative history surrounding the EEA that
alleviates such concerns. 171 EEA prosecutions have been targeted only to egregious and
"open-and-shut" cases. 172 Most indictments involve "offers to sell" or "offers to buy"
purloined trade secrets. 173

168 Robert C. Van Arnam, Business War: Economic Espionage in the United States and the
European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret Protection, 27 N.C. J. I NT' L L. & COM . REG. 95,
112 n.124 (2001); Leslie G. Berkowitz, The Economics Espionage Act of 1996: An Experiment in
Unintended Consequences?, COLO. L AW., Dec. 1997, at 47, 49 (1997):
Private sector impediments [to the effectiveness of the EEA] include: the
unwillingness of businesses to report violations for fear of required disclosure of
trade secrets at trial, the inability of a victim in a criminal case to direct the
litigation; the fear of discovery of misconduct by the defendant corporation, and the
fear of bad publicity that can negatively affect public relations and advertising of
the company's products.

Id.
169 142 CONG. REC. H10,462 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer) ("Our bill was carefully drafted
to avoid this problem [of inhibiting common and acceptable business practices]. The very high intent
requirements and the narrow definition of a trade secret make it clear that we are talking about
extraordinary theft, not mere competition."); see also James M. Fischer, Note, An Analysis of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 25 S ETON HALL L EGIS J. 239 (2001) (discussing concerns surroundi ng
this legislation).
170 See Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 99, at 433 n.184 (noting the number of prosecutions under
the EEA is small compared to other intellectual property violations).
171 142 CONG. REC. H10,462 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer):
First, some Members thought that this legislation might inhibit common and
acceptable business practices. For example, employees leave one company for
another to work for another naturally take their general knowledge and experience
with them and no, no one wishes to see them penalized as a result. Similarly,
reverse engineering is an entirely legitimate practice.
Our bill was carefully drafted to avoid this problem. The very high intent
requirements and the narrow definition of a trade secret make it clear that we are
talking about extraordinary theft, not mere competition.
Second, several Members were concerned that people acting in the public interest
as whistleblowers would be subject to the penalties in this bill.
Again, we have carefully fine-tuned the language to avoid this problem. . . . In other
words, we are talking about thieves, not whistleblowers, and the legislation makes
that clear.

Id.
172 Van Arnam, supra note 168, at 112 (noting that the success of EEA prosecutions may be a
result of the Department of Justice selecting cases it can win); see also Joseph N. Hosteny, The
Economic Espionage Act: A Very Mixed Blessing, I NTELL. P ROP. T ODAY, Feb. 1998, at 8, 10 (addressing
the pros and cons of the EEA).
173 See generally Hosteny, supra note 172, at 10 ("Cases brought thus far under the Economic
Espionage Act appear consistent with the notion that egregious criminal activity will be required to
justify a prosecution, and that foreign involvement enhances the chances of prosecution. All cases
brought thus far comprise incidents of outright bribery and payments for tangible property."); Rowe,
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But therein lies the shortcoming of the EEA. Since September 11, 2001, the
Justice Department and the FBI have been swamped with new priorities and new
threats. 174 Trade secrets thefts are no longer a high priority. 175 The perception exists
that these are business crimes that U.S. companies can litigate in the civil courts. 176
Not so. Trade secret claims cannot be litigated in federal court. There is no civil federal
trade secrets statute, and subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts is often nonexistent. 177
For years, multi-national U.S. corporations have been faced with the dilemma
that major trade secret theft cases are within the "prosecutorial discretion" of the
Justice Department under the EEA178 or limited to the vagaries and procedural
disadvantages of state court litigation. 179 Neither option is satisfactory.
The two proposed critical amendments to the EEA will change the entire
landscape immediately upon passage and President Obama’s signature into law. Our
foreign adversaries and competitors will no longer be able to raid the cookie jar. The
United States will be better able to maintain its competitive and innovation
advantages in the worldwide marketplace. U.S. companies will invest in necessary
measures to protect trade secret assets because they will now have an effective
enforcement and protection in the U.S. courts. Extraterritorial jurisdiction will be
exercised to the full extent of the U.S. Constitution. The competitive innovation
advantages that the United States enjoys will be better protected by these two EEA
amendments. Misappropriators will be caught before further damage can be done. The
amendments to the EEA are critical to provide U.S. corporations with the full benefits
of the EEA and balance the playing field in multi-national competition.

XV. COMPARISONS TO THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
In 2008, it appeared that the CFAA might become the savior for bringing UTSA
trade secret misappropriation actions in state court when there was no diversity of
citizenship. 180 Like the EEA, the CFAA is a criminal statute.181 The difference: the

supra note 58, at 1-5 (discussing an example of employees misappropriating trade secrets and
attempting to sell them on the Internet).
174 Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, Comm. on House Judiciary,
Apr. 26, 2006 (statement of Michael A. Battle, Director of Executive Office for United States
Attorneys), available at 2006 WLNR 7081736 (noting that the prosecution of terrorism since 9/11
continues to be the top priority of every U.S. attorney).
175 Rustad, supra note 4, at 479 n.119. See Hosteny, supra note 172172, at 9 (stating "the EEA is
going to be selectively applied, at least for some time to come"). In many cases, the government only
brings cases where a defendant's criminal intent and knowledge are clear so that there is a high
probability of conviction. Id.
176 Hosteny, supra note 172, at 8.
177 Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Society, 59 O HIO S T. L.J. 1633,
1635 (1998) (noting that trade secrets are regulated differently according to jurisdiction).
178 Hosteny, supra note 172, at 10.
179 McKenzie, supra note 152, at 314-15 (noting that state trade secrets laws do not fill the gap
that federal laws leave open).
180 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
181 Id. § 1030(c) (setting forth punishments ranging from a fine to up to 20 years of imprisonment).
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CFAA provides a civil cause of action: "Any person who suffers damage or loss may
maintain a civil action against the violator...."182
Since most trade secrets now reside in an electronic environment, it was not
surprising that there was an upsurge in CFAA actions: 183 Today, "employers...are
increasingly taking advantage of the CFAA's civil remedies to sue former employees
and their new companies who seek a competitive edge through wrongful use of
information from the former employer's computer system." 184
Section 1030(a) of the CFAA enumerates various categories of misconduct but the
cases involving departing employees focus on the element of "without authorization"
or "exceeding authorized access."185 Recent cases have recognized that the CFAA
provides a remedy against disloyal employees who download, transfer or delete trade
secret information on company computers and who engage in other acts of trade secret
misappropriation involving computers. 186
The seminal decisions in Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. 187 and International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin 188 illustrate the
attempt to use of the CFAA to combat trade secret misappropriation and to provide
access to the U.S. federal courts. 189
In Shurgard, employees accessed plaintiff's computer to transmit trade secrets to
the new employer. 190 The district court rejected the argument that these employees
had authorized access to Shurgard's computer system because they were still employed
at Shurgard. 191 Instead, the court held that these employees lost their authorization
and were "without authorization" when they accessed the Shurgard's computer system
to send proprietary information via email to their new employer. 192
In International Airport Centers v. Citrin, the reasoning in Shurgard was
buttressed in an opinion by Judge Posner writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 193 Once again, the facts involved a disloyal employee who decided to quit and
start up his own competing business. 194 Before he quit, however, Citrin deleted all the

182 Id. § 1030(g) (allowing causes of action can be maintained for compensatory damages or
equitable relief, such as an injunction).
183 Leslie G. Berkowitz, Computer Security and Privacy: The Third Wave of Property Law, COLO.
L AW., February 2004, at 57, 59 (addressing the problems facing the information property wave); Linda
K. Stevens & Jesi J. Carlson, The CFAA: New Remedies for Employee Computer Abuse, 96 I LL. B.J.
144, 144-45 (2008) (pointing out the increased number of law suits brought under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act).
184 Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003).
185 See United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Shamrock Foods Co. v.
Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Ariz. 2008).
186
Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc. v. Nichols, 551 F. Supp. 2d 704 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (granting
employee's motion to dismiss because employer failed to allege damage under the CFAA).
187 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
188 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
189 Id.; Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
190 Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. The trade secrets at issue included plans for the
development of a system for maximizing growth in the self -service storage facility industry. Id.
191 Id. at 1129 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
192 Id.
193 Citrin, 440 F.3d 418.
194 Id. at 419. The trade secrets at issue were data collected that identified pote ntial acquisition
targets in the real estate industry. Id.
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data that he had collected on potential acquisition targets for the benefit of IAC. 195 The
issue was whether such pre-termination activities violated the CFAA because Citrin
was authorized to use the laptop computer. 196 The Seventh Circuit made short shrift
of this argument, holding that Citrin's authorization to access the company-issued
laptop computer terminated when he breached his duty of loyalty to his former
employer. 197
However, the CFAA is not a federal trade secrets statute. The CFAA is primarily
aimed at computer crimes, and the CFAA only has relevance to trade secret
misappropriation claims when the trade secret theft coincides with computer
misuse. 198 Courts have been reluctant to transform the CFAA into a surrogate federal
trade secret statute, and there have been numerous cases litigating the scope of the
CFAA in recent years. 199
In addition, there are now splits in the appellate courts regarding the necessary
elements to prove up a CFAA violation together and the $5000 jurisdictional
requirement.200 The CFAA is a patchwork of amendments dating back to 1984 and
reflect the attempts by the Congress to prohibit Internet computer crimes.201 In recent
years, the CFAA has been under attack for overzealous prosecutions of alleged CFAA
violations. 202
Those who suggest that the CFAA can fill the gap in existing federal law for a
federal trade secret cause of action are out of step with judicial decisions and attacks
on the CFAA in recent years. Federal jurisdiction cannot rest entirely on the CFAA in
complex trade secrets litigation. Instead, a federal trade secret statute is required. The
solution is to enact, as soon as possible, the EEA amendments recommended in this
article.

XVI. OTHER ADVANTAGES OF AN EEA CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION
Adding a private cause of action to the EEA will eliminate many of the barriers
that now exist to the full realization of the benefits of the EEA.
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The primary obstacle is the high burden of proof to obtain a criminal conviction
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 203 Prosecutors want to proceed only with
indictments they know will result in a conviction or plea agreement -- often requiring
wiretap or video evidence to secure convictions. 204
Invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination also
hampers EEA prosecutions. 205 This is not an advantageous option in a civil suit since
the invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding will result in a default
judgment for the Plaintiff. 206
Finally, adding a civil cause of action to the EEA will lower the burden of proof
standard to the "preponderance of the evidence". 207 159 This is the same burden of
proof standard for UTSA actions in state court. 208 The result will be more actions by
U.S. companies to protect corporate trade secret assets benefiting the shareholders of
U.S. companies as well as the U.S. economy.

XVII. CONCLUSION
Preventing cybercrime and protection from would-be trade secret thieves is in the
national and economic interest of the United States. This was true in 2008 and it is
even more so today. Economic espionage and trade secret thefts compromise American
companies and entrepreneurs, result in the loss of jobs and the loss of intellectual
property investments, and weaken the American economy both at home and abroad.
Two critical EEA amendments are necessary and compelling: (1) a civil cause of action
providing federal subject matter jurisdiction for the theft of trade secrets; (2) a civil
seizure provision, with appropriate protections and judicial oversight, to prevent the
destruction of evidence and the unlawful transfer and loss of trade secrets to other
countries outside the United States. After 7 years of vetting these two critical
amendments, the time has come for the bicameral introduction and swift passage of
the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015.
203 Rustad, supra note 4, at 522; Mondaq Bus. Briefing, Restrictive Covenants and Trade Secrets
Frequently Asked Questions on United States, July 12, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16881363.
204 Hosteny, supra note 172, at 9-10; see Rustad, supra note 4, at 458.
The data on EEA defendant characteristics, targeted companies, the nature of trade
secrets stolen, the method of misappropriation, and trends in cases prosecuted,
reveals that the federal criminal statute is not punishing and deterring state sponsored espionage. EEA prosecutors focus on domestic trade secret theft rather
than foreign government involvement in industrial and economic espionage.
Cybercriminals and other trade secret misappropriators are unlikely to be deterred
with such a dismal record of detection and punishment of economic espionage by
federal law enforcement.
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